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BUILDING AN EFFECTIVE TRADE PRACTICES COMMISSION: THE 
ROLE OF PROFESSOR ROBERT BAXT AO 
 
Stephen Corones, David Merrett and David Round 
 
Queensland University of Technology, University of Melbourne, and University of 
South Australia 
  
Bob Baxt, the third Chairman of the Trade Practices Commission, served for a single 
three year term from 1988 to 1991. He followed Bob McComas, who had deliberately 
adopted a non-litigious approach to preserving the competitive process, believing that 
he understood business as an insider and that much of what it did was not anti-
competitive, when correctly viewed. Baxt was far more pro-active in his approach, 
and more closely aligned with that of the first Chairman, Ron Bannerman. Baxt 
sought to push the frontiers of investigation and precedent, and perhaps, more 
significantly, sought to influence his Ministers, the government, public servants and 
public opinion about the need to expand the coverage of the Trade Practices Act, 
increase penalties and properly resource the Commission so that it could perform its 
assigned roles. This article examines Baxt‘s early and on-going role in teaching 
Australian students and professionals through his interdisciplinary Trade Practices 
Workshops, the political context of Baxt‘s tenure, including his relations with the 
Attorney-General ,Michael Duffy, and his skilful handling of the Queensland Wire 
case. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) currently employs 
660 people throughout Australia – a mix of economists, lawyers, regulatory analysts 
and support staff deployed in regional offices in each state and territory capital as well 
as in Townsville. Its total revenue for financial year 2006-07 was $104.9 million for 
operating expenses and $3.9 million for capital funding.
1
 It is now one of the most 
highly regarded competition enforcement agencies in the world.
2
 The ACCC enjoys 
not only structural independence from government in the sense that it is an 
independent statutory authority, but also operational independence in that its budget 
allows it to enforce the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) (TPA) against the best 
resourced corporations in Australia.  
 
The importance of competition in promoting economic growth and enhancing 
consumer welfare is well understood throughout the Australian community. The 
ACCC is widely regarded as the watchdog that promotes competition and protects 
consumers. It enjoys broad grassroots support throughout the community, and this, in 
turn, has resulted in support for the ACCC being regarded by governments as a vote-
winner. The current Chairman of the ACCC, Mr Graeme Samuel, is Australia‟s most 
widely recognised regulator and competition policy occupies centre stage in national 
discourse. 
                                                 
1 ACCC, Annual Report 2006-07, p 11. 
2 In the 2007 survey by Global Competition Review the ACCC‟s enforcement work was rated fifth out 
of 38 competition and fair trading enforcement agencies, behind the EC Commission, the US Fair 
Trade Commission and the UK Competition Commission, but ahead of France, Germany and Canada. 
See ACCC, ACCC Update No. 22, p 18. 
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It was not always so. The ACCC came into existence on 6 November 1995, as a result 
of a merger between the Trade Practices Commission (TPC) and the Prices 
Surveillance Authority. During the early years of the TPC‟s life, there was a general 
lack of appreciation of the important role played by competition in promoting 
economic growth, and a lack of political will to support the work of the Commission, 
with the result that it struggled for existence and maintained a tenuous hold in the 
Australian regulatory scheme.  
 
In a previous article we explored the early years of competition enforcement in 
Australia and the role of the first Chairman of the Commission, Ron Bannerman.
3
 A 
theme that emerges from these articles is that the early Chairmen faced considerable 
hardships, not just in terms of the workload and pressures of the office, but in gaining 
acceptance for the TPA by government, business and the broader community.  
 
This article evaluates the performance of Professor Robert Baxt who was Chairman of 
the TPC from 7 April 1988 to 30 June 1991 in the context of what occurred before his 
appointment and what happened after he left the Commission.
4
 He only served one 
three year term towards the end of which he fell out with the government that 
appointed him, largely because his attempts to strengthen the agency and develop the 
law were ahead of government thinking. In this profile we seek to demonstrate that 
there was more to the Baxt years than meets the eye. It is based on Baxt‟s published 
papers and two recorded interviews.
5
  
 
BAXT AS SCHOLAR AND EDUCATOR 
 
Baxt was educated at Newington College, in Sydney and at the University of Sydney 
graduating with a Bachelor of Arts and a Bachelor of Laws.
6
 During his law studies 
he became fascinated by the development of the common law doctrine of restraint of 
trade, and by the early attempts to legislate to protect competition in Australia through 
the Australian Industries Protection Act 1906 (Cth).  
 
At Law School Baxt was a contemporary of John Howard, and the two belonged to a 
group called „The Droners‟ that used to meet at Baxt‟s Strathfield home to discuss 
politics and current affairs. They were also articled clerks at the same law firm in 
Sydney, Rosenblums.
7
  
 
He practised as a solicitor in New South Wales between 1963 and 1965. In 1965, he 
enrolled in the LLM program at Harvard Law School and studied US antitrust law. 
When he returned to Australia he took up an appointment as a lecturer in law in the 
Faculty of Economics at the University of Sydney. He moved to Monash University 
                                                 
3  Merrett, The Introduction of Competition Policy;  See also Corones, Bob McComas.  
4 At the time of Baxt‟s appointment the TPA used the term „Chairman‟ as the statutory term for the 
head of the Trade Practices Commission. The gender neutral term „Chair‟ was not adopted until an 
amendment made by the Competition Policy Reform Act 1995 (Cth). Throughout this paper the 
statutory term „Chairman‟ will be used rather than the gender neutral term „Chair‟. 
5 The first interview with Robert Baxt was conducted on 21 December 2004 by Stephen Corones, 
David Merrett, and David Round. The second interview with Robert Baxt was conducted on 4 June 
2007 by Stephen Corones, David Merrett, and David Round. 
6 Who‘s Who in Australia, p207. 
7 Errington, John Winston Howard p 34. 
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in 1968. During this early period Baxt assisted in writing the first analysis of the 
Restrictive Trade Practices Act as it then was.
8
 
 
In 1972 Baxt was appointed the Sir John Latham Professor of Law at Monash 
University, a position which he held until 1988. In 1980 he was appointed Dean of the 
Faculty. While at Monash University he was a Consultant with law firm, Phillips Fox 
& Masel. Graeme Samuel, Chairman of the ACCC since 1 July 2003, was at that time 
the partner responsible for building up the firm‟s competition law practice.  
 
Collaboration between Baxt and Brunt 
 
With the election of the Whitlam Labor government in 1972, Lionel Murphy, the 
Attorney-General, wanted Australia to have a modern competition law based, in part, 
on the United States Sherman Act. Murphy wanted parts of the Sherman Act, such as 
private actions, per se rules, and a court-centred enforcement process, but side-by-side 
with this he also wanted an authorisation process whereby firms could apply to the 
Trade Practices Commission, and on appeal the Trad Practices Tribunal, to have their 
conduct authorised if it gave rise to a net public benefit. The Murphy Trade Practices 
Bill 1973 led to considerable debate, and Baxt was an active participant in the debate. 
 
In a leading article co-authored with Professor Maureen Brunt of the Faculty of 
Economics and Politics at Monash University, Baxt praised the dual adjudication 
system adopted because in the field of competition law, all conduct especially that 
involving public policy choices does not lend itself to the judicial function.
9
   
 
Baxt and Brunt summarised the underlying philosophy of the Murphy Trade Practices 
Bill: 
 
If the law can be stated with reasonable precision, the prospective liability 
established by per se rules or strong presumptions, such that the commission 
of an offence is knowable and avoidable, then the appropriate enforcement 
institution is a court and the appropriate remedy not only an injunction but 
also punishment. If, on the other hand, the law requires extended analysis of 
economic cause and effect, including complex evaluation of public interest 
criteria, in a way that makes the decision essentially more ―open‖ and more 
uncertain, we believe the appropriate institution is an administrative tribunal 
and the appropriate remedy merely an order to cease.
10
 
 
However, the authors demonstrated a degree of prescience in identifying a 
fundamental problem with such a demarcation between public interest and 
competition: 
 
                                                 
8 Masterman, Australian Trade Practices Law. 
9 See Stevens, Restrictive Practices Court especially Pt II, pp 23-138. According to Stevens (at p. 41): 
„The issue of justiciability…resolves into a question of the ability of the legislature so to embody in to 
a principle the policies which it intends to be effectuated by the Act, that the courts are left with 
sufficiently clearly defined standards to operate the judicial process efficiently by keeping discretion 
within narrow limits.‟ 
10 Baxt, The Murphy Trade Practices Bill, p 8. 
 4 
For the courts, the touchstone is to be not public interest but competition. In 
the United States, likewise, the touchstone is competition. But just what does 
this mean in practice? Do public interest – market performance – efficiency 
vanish? What concepts of competition – and what operational tests – have 
appeared germane? What kind of evidence and analysis is used? 
11
 
 
In the intervening years the courts have had to wrestle with these questions. Some, 
such as the extent to which the courts are required to take into account efficiency 
considerations in assessing competition, and how to balance efficiency gains against 
any lessening of competition, remain unanswered.
12
 
 
Baxt and Brunt were also critical of the undue reliance in the Murphy Trade Practices 
Bill placed on the very general prohibitions found in the US Sherman Act and other 
vague expressions which were not adequately defined in the Murphy Bill.
 13
 They 
referred to this as „Shermanism‟.14  
   
Soon after taking up his professorial appointment at Monash, Baxt joined with 
Professor Maureen Brunt, Jack Fajgenbaum QC
15
 and Gary Purcell, and together they 
developed and taught the first interdisciplinary university coursework Masters in 
Restrictive Trade Practices in Australia. Baxt and Fajgenbaum focused on the law, 
while Brunt and Purcell focused on the economics. The course was open to students 
of both the Faculty of Law and the Faculty of Economics and Politics at Monash 
University.
16
  
 
The inspiration for the new interdisciplinary law and economics course was that run at 
Harvard University, which Baxt and Brunt had experienced first hand. Professor 
Brunt had completed her PhD in economics at Harvard University and been greatly 
influenced by Edward S. Mason.
 17
   
In the following extract Baxt provides some background to the Monash Restrictive 
Trade Practices course and why it was taught: 
 
The joint course was taught in the context of hypothetical Australian problems. But 
in the absence of Australian cases, we were forced to use US, English and 
European materials. These materials came from decided cases, reports, articles 
and other materials which emanated from those jurisdictions…. 
 
Then came the change of parties in 1972 with the election of the Whitlam Labor 
Government team. The late Lionel Murphy wanted Australia to have a modern 
                                                 
11 Baxt, The Murphy Trade Practices Bill, p11. 
12 See Corones, Competition Law in Australia, pp 30-45 and Williams, The Relation of Efficiencies, 
p 442. 
13 Baxt, The Murphy Trade Practices Bill, pp 11-41. 
14 Baxt, The Murphy Trade Practices Bill, p 36. 
15 Through Jack Fajgenbaum, Baxt met Alan Goldberg (now, Justice Goldberg of the Federal Court of 
Australia) who was a member Fajgenbaum‟s Chambers. Baxt‟s friendship with Goldberg was to prove 
invaluable when Baxt eventually took up his appointment as Chairman of the TPC.  
16 Those responsible for teaching the course eventually transferred to the Law School at The University 
of Melbourne in the late 1980‟s where it is still taught today. 
17 Mason, Economic Concentration; Mason, Monopoly in Law and Economics; Mason, Current Status. 
Brunt‟s writings on competition law are collected in Brunt, Economic Essays. 
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competition law. There were exciting days as the Trade Practices Bill 1973 led to 
considerable debate which became a litmus for our course. Maureen Brunt and I 
set about the writing of a lengthy article on this Bill. We produced what we would 
still regard as an important piece on the current legislation, namely Baxt and 
Brunt (1974). …We believe our input provided some useful guide to the 
Government in finalising their legislation. Many changes were made to the 
Murphy Bill. To a large extent, the Trade Practices Act 1974 retained the structure 
and approach adopted by the Murphy legislation - in particular, the dual 
enforcement approach.
18
 
 
Trade Practices Workshop 
 
Australia did not have a long history of judicial involvement in the interpretation and 
application of legislation that incorporated economic concepts. Soon after the TPA 
commenced, Baxt realised that economists and lawyers would have to work together 
to solve the problems posed by the new law and much careful thought would need to 
be given to teaching lawyers and judges what the economic concepts meant, and, 
more importantly, how the views of economists and economic learning could best be 
used in the case-by-case development of the law by the courts and administrative 
agencies.  
 
Baxt did not want to confine the benefits of his multidisciplinary Masters course on 
Restrictive Trade Practices to a small number of postgraduate students who were just 
beginning their legal careers; there was a more pressing need to educate the lawyers, 
economists and judges who would actually be required to give effect to the new law 
as soon as it took effect. In the 1970s and 1980s most judges were without any formal 
training in economics and were suddenly confronted in court with expert economists 
who spoke a different language. Baxt organised one-day seminars at Monash for 
practitioners and judges as part of the Centre for Commercial Law and Applied Legal 
Research which Baxt had been instrumental in establishing. This was the first time 
that lawyers, economists, academics and judges had sat down together to seek to find 
interdisciplinary solutions to the problems posed by the new legislation.  
 
Baxt was not alone in appreciating the urgent need to educate lawyers and judges in 
this area. In 1975, Professor Don Harding of the Law Faculty at the University of 
New South Wales, in conjunction with Gaire Blunt, a partner with law firm, Allen, 
Allen and Hemsley, and Howard Schrieber, a partner with law firm, Stephen Jacques 
& Stephen convened a Trade Practices Workshop of the leading practitioners in the 
field.  
 
The original founders of the Trade Practices Workshop attended Baxt‟s practitioner 
seminars at Monash. They invited him to assume responsibility for the planning of 
future Trade Practices Workshops which were organised by Baxt under the auspices 
of the Centre for Commercial Law at Monash University.
19
  
 
FROM SCHOLAR TO REGULATOR 
 
                                                 
18 See Baxt, The Australian Concept of Market, pp 11-12. 
19 The Business Law Section of the Law Council of Australia ultimately assumed responsibility for the 
organisation of the annual Trade Practices Workshop. 
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The Job Offer 
 
Baxt‟s appointment as Chairman of the TPC came at a critical period in the life of the 
enforcement agency. At that time the Attorney-General‟s Department was responsible 
for the administration of the TPA. Lionel Bowen was the Attorney-General. Although 
Lionel Bowen took a keen interest in the Commission‟s work, he lacked the political 
influence of the Treasurer in Cabinet meetings. The TPA was only one piece of 
legislation for which the Attorney-General was responsible and it was well down the 
pecking order in term of its importance. 
 
Baxt‟s predecessors had been largely passive and reactive. Bannerman admits that his 
principal ambition during his term as Chairman was to bring the TPA „to the point 
where [the Act] had passed the point of death‟.20 Bannerman was a man of great 
integrity but essentially a Canberra public servant with a strong power base in the 
Canberra bureaucracy. By the time of his departure the TPC had a precarious foothold 
in the institutional framework regulating the economy.  
 
Bannerman‟s successor as Chairman of the TPC, Robert McComas, was a successful 
corporate lawyer with a strong power base in the business community where he 
served on the boards of a number of major corporations. McComas adopted a laissez 
faire approach to the administration of competition law – towards compromise and 
settlement rather than confrontation and litigation. The way he assessed mergers and 
acquisitions lacked transparency. From 1985 to 1987 mergers, such as that between 
G.J.Coles & company Ltd and Myer Emporium Limited, News Ltd and Herald and 
Weekly Times Limited, and the acquisition by T.N.T and News Ltd (joint owners of 
Ansett Transport Industries Ltd) of East-West Airlines were given informal clearances 
in return for undertakings to divest some assets. The Commission‟s assessment of the 
likely impact of these mergers on competition was attracting adverse comment in the 
financial press. An editorial in the Australian Financial Review observed: 
 
Government regulation of the airline industry has been far more restrictive 
than anything which affected the media. All the profitable trunk routes in 
Australia have for decades been reserved for two airlines – Ansett and the 
government airline. 
Over the past two or three years, East-West, which has been a small capital-
short internal New South Wales airline for the most of its history, has begun to 
make waves by offering cheaper fares on national routes… 
So by what can hardly be accepted as a coincidence, the owners of Ansett 
have moved to take over East-West only a month or two after the government 
announced its intention to end the two-airline system. 
It is about as much a coincidence as Rupert Murdoch‘s move to take over the 
Herald and Weekly Times was coming a few weeks after the government 
announced its intention to make vast and liberating changes in the regulation 
of the television industry. 
Both cases were simply signals to aggressive, major entrepreneurial 
corporations that they had to move fast to reinforce or establish dominant 
positions. 
21
  
                                                 
20 Merrett, The Introduction of Competition Policy. 
21 See Australian Financial Review, The East-West Challenge, p 12.  
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The appointment of an academic to succeed McComas may have surprised some at 
the time but there has been a long tradition in the United States of leading academic 
lawyers and economists occupying senior positions within the US Department of 
Justice (primarily responsible for competition law enforcement) and the Federal Trade 
Commission (primarily, responsible for consumer protection enforcement). 
 
How did Baxt come to be offer the position as Chairman of the TPC? 
 
Why did the Labor Government approach me to do it in ‘88?  I don‘t know, I‘d 
certainly been an outspoken critic.  What I‘d done at Monash, running a 
number of workshops and so on. I had a great deal to do with Tony Hartnell 
who was then at the Department of Business and Consumer Affairs, with John 
Howard.  I was very keen on the Trade Practices Act working and after the 
Swanson Committee had been appointed, it looked like the Act was really 
going to be pared right back. They wanted to get rid of it.  They wanted to ban 
– to get rid of – section 50. They didn‘t want any control of mergers. Fraser 
was very keen to get rid of that and John Howard saved that.  By the way, I 
should tell you, I went through Law School with John.  We did articles 
together. I know him very, very well. When I was at the Commission I used to 
see John, I‘d say, four or five times while I was there. He was either the leader 
of the Opposition or in a prominent position, to talk about Trade Practices 
issues. So I think I had a reasonable link with the political parties. I guess they 
felt that an academic would be a pretty safe bet after McComas. McComas 
was very, very heavily criticised over all the deals he did on mergers.
22
 
 
Transparency and accountability  
 
As soon as Baxt was appointed he announced that there would be a break with the 
past. In future, there would be no more behind-the-scenes deals on mergers. If a 
proposed merger were likely to result in the merged firm occupying a dominant 
position in a market, the parties would be invited to apply for an authorisation so that 
it could be subject to public scrutiny. The Commission would consult widely with all 
of those likely to be affected by the merger and any claimed benefits would be 
carefully assessed.  
 
Baxt explained: 
 
I was disappointed in the way in which mergers were handled. I was 
disappointed when some of these high profile cases weren‘t run. Bill Coad 
who was the Deputy Chairman… said to me very early in the piece: ―I want to 
have a serious talk with you. I want to change the way in which we look at 
mergers.‖ And I said: ― I‘m glad you approached me, Bill,  because that was 
my thinking.‖ …We published the new [guidelines] that discussed the way that 
mergers would be looked at, which lead to the famous front page of The 
Financial Review: ―Baxt Attacked by McComas‖ .23 
 
                                                 
22 Baxt, 2004 Interview, p4. 
23 Baxt, 2007 Interview, pp 7-8. 
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Baxt believed enforcement agencies should not act behind closed doors; rather, they 
should act in an open, transparent matter so that administrative decisions would be 
made on the basis of all the available information. This would reduce the risk of 
regulatory error. Baxt believed that the Commission should disclose in advance its 
administrative procedures and decision-making processes; the policies and practices it 
would employ when enforcing the TPA. In this way, those affected by the TPA would 
know in advance what the Commission understood the law to mean, and when and 
how it would enforce it. Firms would then be put in a position whereby they could 
organise and plan how they would conduct their affairs and meet their obligations 
under the TPA. 
 
During his term as Chairman, he pushed for changes in two broad areas: first, in 
making the TPC a more effective enforcement agency by developing a coherent 
compliance strategy; and secondly, by promoting the universal application of the 
competition provisions of the TPA and pushing for a more coherent competition 
policy.  
 
CREATING A MORE EFFECTIVE AGENCY AND COMPLIANCE 
STRATEGY  
 
When Baxt took over as Chairman, he was concerned that the TPA was not taken 
seriously either by the Government or the business community. Iit was regarded by 
both as „second class‟ economic law.24 He was also concerned about the TPC‟s low 
profile: 
 
When I joined the Commission it had a regrettably low profile – many mistook 
it for the National Companies and Securities Commission; others felt it had 
been too soft in dealing with mergers and consumer protection.
25
 
 
Inadequate Resources 
 
Baxt identified the grave need for additional resources if the TPC was to carry out its 
enforcement role in an open, transparent manner, but his constant attempts to secure 
increased funding were rebuffed by the Cabinet. Resources were needed not just for 
running trials in court, but also for gathering the evidence to be used in the trials.
26
  
 
Baxt drew attention to the implications of inadequate funding in his Ruby Hutchinson 
Memorial Address: 
 
If the adjudicative system does not permit the unhappy citizen to bring 
proceedings (because of cost), or in any event in the context of serious 
breaches of the fundamental law, then we must have appropriately resourced 
agencies which are given the responsibility to litigate. Whilst we prefer not to 
litigate because of the inherent difficulties with the process, when we do 
                                                 
24 Hansard (Senate) 15 October 1991, p 2011. 
25 Hansard (Senate) 15 October 1991, p 2021. After the announcement of his appointment Baxt 
received a letter from a very senior judge of the Victorian Supreme Court congratulating him on his 
appointment as Chairman of the National Companies and Securities Commission. See Baxt, Bob Baxt 
Reflects. 
26 Baxt, The Role of Regulators, p 76. 
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choose that route we should be assured of adequate resources to enable us to 
fulfil our obligations. It is too easy for our opponents to use the legal 
mechanism to create costly delays (all quite proper in the technical sense). It 
is too difficult for us often to ensure we can pay for the best lawyer to carry 
our flag into the gladiatorial arena.
27
 
 
Baxt was constantly frustrated that he could not secure sufficient funding from 
Government to brief the best counsel to run test cases in the courts. The Commission 
was at the time restricted by government policy from paying senior counsel more than 
a certain benchmark rate in fees in its cases. This contrasts with the fees that the 
private sector was able to pay to attract the best senior counsel. 
 
Baxt commented: 
 
We knew who the Counsel were who weren‘t going to do the work for us on 
the Bob Alexander [fee] scale…. In the Arnotts cas, Bruce Oslington…was 
chosen because …he was a QC and had some experience… but it was a hard 
slog… I think he cut his teeth on that case and did a very good job on it in the 
final analysis. But the Commission had to spend a huge amount of money. [It] 
had to hire additional barristers and others to go and do market work in order 
to run that case… I used Alan Goldberg. I‘d ring Alan and he was always 
willing to help..
28
  
 
Case Management in the Federal Court 
 
Baxt was also frustrated by the inability of the Federal Court judges to manage trade 
practices cases effectively and their ability to interpret and apply economic concepts – 
the very things he predicted would be problematic in his early article with Maureen 
Brunt.
29
  
 
In Baxt‟s first major merger case, Trade Practices Commission v Arnotts,30 the 
Commission sought an order to restrain the acquisition by Arnotts Ltd of Nabisco‟s 
biscuit business. The Commission argued that as a result of the acquisition, Arnotts 
would be, or would be likely to be, in a position to dominate the biscuit market in 
contravention of s 50(1)(a). Alternatively, the Commission argued that the acquisition 
would, or would be likely to, substantially strengthen the power of Arnotts to 
dominate the biscuit market in contravention of s 50(1)(b)(ii). 
 
The primary judge, held that the difficulty faced by new entrants in obtaining shelf 
space for their biscuits in the major retail supermarket chains was a significant barrier 
to entry.
31
 Biscuits are usually grouped together in supermarkets and Arnotts‟ biscuits 
are generally placed first in the traffic occupying about half of the shelf space 
allocated to biscuits. Accordingly, the Court concluded that it would be very difficult 
and very expensive for a new entrant to convince supermarkets to make additional 
                                                 
27 Baxt, Ruby Hutchinson Memorial Address, p2. 
28 Baxt, 2004 Interview, p 9-10. 
29 Baxt, The Murphy Trade Practices Bill, p8. 
30 (1990) ATPR 41-062. 
31 (1990) ATPR 41-062 at 51-874.  
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space available. This was confirmed on appeal by the Full Federal Court.
32
 In these 
early cases the courts struggled to fashion rules to admit the expert economists‟ 
testimony. 
33
  
 
Baxt provided the following insights into the lack of effective judicial control in that 
case: 
 
The Arnotts case was absolutely unacceptable to me … Justice Shepherd, 
when he first was given the matter for hearing, suggested eight weeks as a 
timetable. The case took 11 months…There were a number of reasons. One 
was we had a very inexperienced barrister at the time, Bruce Oslington.  He 
did a great job, but he was inexperienced and he was facing a very, very 
experienced trade practices lawyer who used every trick in the book, Charles 
Sweeney. I was very outspoken about the fact that the court cases of this kind 
should not be allowed to run that long.I was tackled at the Commonwealth 
Law Conference by a judge from the Federal Court in a conference session 
about why are you challenging the judges and not the barristers? Ah, but the 
judges control the Courts. They should be able to do something better. And 
some judges are very, very polite and let Counsel get away with it. Others are 
much tougher and just bring Counsel to order.
34
 
 
The second merger case to be fully argued during Baxt‟s term, was Trade Practices 
Commission v Australia Meat Holdings.
35
 SCI Meat and Paper Pty Ltd, Tancred 
Brothers Pty Ltd, Metro Meat Ltd and Elders IXL Ltd, combined their Queensland 
meat processing operations forming a joint venture company, Australia Meat 
Holdings Pty Ltd, (AMH) of which they were four equal shareholders. AMH acquired 
the whole of the issued capital of Thomas Borthwick and Sons (Australasia) Ltd 
which had abattoirs at Bowen and Mackay. 
 
Wilcox J found that there was a separate market in northern Queensland for fat cattle 
and that the acquisition would enable Australia Meat Holdings to dominate the market 
in the sense in which he construed the term.
36
  His Honour observed: „The proper 
definition of a market is entirely a matter of fact, the determination of which ought not 
to be made more protracted and expensive by the adduction of unnecessary expert 
evidence,‟ 37 The case took less time in the hearing phase (three months from the start 
of the hearing to the decision), but a further two years to be finally resolved by the 
divestiture of the assets held to be in breach of the TPA. 
 
Inadequate Penalties 
 
Baxt was concerned that many of the excesses of the late 1980‟s and early 1990‟s in 
the area of competition and consumer protection law were committed by some of the 
                                                 
32 (1990) 24 FCR 313. 
33  French, Judicial Approaches, pp 560-565; and Beaton-Wells C., Proof of Antitrust Markets, pp 296-
314. 
34 Baxt, 2004 Interview, p 8. 
35 Trade Practices Commission v Australia Meat Holdings Ltd (1988) 83 ALR 299. 
36 (1988) 83 ALR 299 at 351. 
37 (1988) 83 ALR 299 at 316. 
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most reputable corporations in the country, including CSR Ltd,
38
 Carlton United 
Breweries Ltd
39
 and Sony (Australia) Pty Ltd.
40
 There was little evidence of a culture 
of corporate compliance so far as the TPA was concerned.  
 
In Baxt‟s view, there were two main reasons for this. First, the sanctions for breaching 
the TPA were too low to act as a real deterrent. The second was the inadequate 
resources allocated by the Government to the Commission to enforce the law. If the 
TPA was to be taken seriously by business the low penalties would have to be 
increased substantially.
41
 The maximum penalty for breaching Pt IV of the TPA at the 
time was only $250,000. Baxt realized that this was woefully inadequate to act as a 
deterrent. He set about advocating for substantially increased penalties, including 
disgorgement of profits gained from engaging in the illegal conduct.
42
  
 
For example, in TPC v Carlton & United Breweries Ltd,43 CUB admitted that it had 
contravened s 46(1)(c) in February 1987 by taking advantage of its „substantial 
market power‟ in the beer market or as a buyer of beverage cans. It had done so for 
the purpose of deterring or preventing Payless from engaging in competitive conduct 
by selling and supplying Payless beer in Victoria and New South Wales. 
The managing director of CUB, Mr Bartels, had been concerned about the possible 
negative effect of the introduction of generic beer on the national beer market by 
Payless and others.  At the time 70% of CUB‟s requirement of beer cans came from 
Gadsden, and this represented more than 50% of Gadsden‟s sales in 1987. Gadsden 
was a wholly owned subsidiary of SA Brewing Holdings Ltd. Mr Bartels telephoned 
the then managing director of SA Brewing, Mr Wheatland, to register his concern 
about the Payless beer plan. 
Mr Bartels also called the then managing director of Gadsden, Mr Wilson, and told 
him of CUB‟s concerns about SA Brewing supplying generic beer to Payless. Mr 
Bartels told Mr Wilson that CUB had decided to reduce substantially its purchase of 
cans as a result. SA Brewing subsequently told Payless, in late March 1987, that it 
would not be supplying it with beer for its generic beer products.  
Northrop J granted an injunction and imposed a pecuniary penalty pursuant to s 76 of 
the TPA. Baxt commented: 
…but it was just so frustrating for the Commission. We felt … why are we running 
a case against John Elliott [then chairman of CUB] where he was going to be 
fined $220,000.  I think the Commission kept the cheque and delayed for a long, 
long time before they banked it, as a souvenir of a victory over John Elliott and 
CUB at  the time.
44
 
 
It was only after Baxt left the Commission that the penalty regime was amended.
45
 
                                                 
38 Trade Practices Commission v CSR Ltd (1991) ATPR 41-076. 
39 Trade Practices Commission v Carlton United Breweries Ltd (1990) ATPR 41-037. 
40 Trade Practices Commission v Sony (Australia) Pty Ltd (1990) ATPR 41-053. 
41 See Baxt R., “The Trade Practices Commission” in Stewart R., (ed), Government and Business 
Relations in Australia (Allen and Unwin, 1994) 150 at 164-9. 
42 Baxt, The Trade Practices Commission, pp 169-71; See also Baxt, The Role of Regulators, p 79. 
43 (1990) 24 FCR 532. 
44 Baxt, 2004 Interview, p 13. 
45 The maximum penalty for corporations was increased to $10 million. See Trade Practices 
Legislation amendment Act 1992 (Cth) which took effect on 21 January 1993. 
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Enforcement Strategy 
 
There is an on-going debate about the circumstances about when potential breaches of 
the TPA should be resolved by the courts through litigation and when they should be 
settled by enforceable undertakings negotiated outside the courts. Settlements save the 
courts and those involved in the alleged contraventions, time and money. Given the 
TPC‟s limited resources, it was neither possible nor desirable to litigate every 
detected breach of the law in court. Baxt was keen to develop a coherent enforcement 
strategy which set out to match the Commission‟s limited resources against the 
available evidence.  
 
Professor John Braithwaite was appointed as a part-time Commissioner on 2 January 
1986 for a period of three years. He was a Senior Research Fellow at the Research 
School of Social Sciences in the Australian National University and an expert on 
regulatory theory and practice. Together, Allan Asher who was appointed as a full-
time commissioner by the Labor Government in 1988, he developed an „enforcement 
pyramid‟ approach to compliance which relied on the resources/ evidence nexus.46  
 
Under this approach, litigation and the imposition of criminal and pecuniary penalties 
would only be sought infrequently in relation to the most serious breaches of the TPA 
such as price fixing cartels and market sharing and the most egregious forms of unfair 
trading practices or scams that undermined consumer confidence in the workings of 
free markets. Such cases are so corrosive of the public‟s trust that they should only be 
resolved through the courts. This type of case sat at the apex of the pyramid.  
 
The overall objective of the enforcement pyramid approach was to gain widespread 
compliance with the TPA on a limited budget. In such circumstances litigation was 
not necessarily the most effective means of obtaining compliance. Litigation has 
considerable disadvantages: it is expensive, slow and targets only one industry player. 
Baxt believed that litigation would only be appropriate ‗if the case will perform a 
pivotal role in securing a major breakthrough in industry compliance levels 
generally.‘47  
 
At the next level below litigation sat negotiated settlements and court enforceable 
undertakings which would be closely monitored by the Commission. At the next level 
down, below court enforceable undertakings, sat voluntary compliance and industry 
self-regulation codes. Finally, at the base of the pyramid sat education, information 
and liaison. 
 
No one part of the pyramid operated in isolation. Careful and consistent selection of 
the appropriate compliance strategy was critical. Before deciding on the appropriate 
level of regulation, the Commission would gauge the level of non-compliance in the 
industry or sector as a whole and assess the appropriate regulatory response. If the 
problem was not serious or widespread, it might run information seminars. It would 
endeavour to interact and communicate with industry or sector representatives about 
the issues and their responsibilities under the TPA, but industry engagement might not 
                                                 
46 Ayres, Responsive Regulation. See also Braithwaite, Responsive Business Regulatory Institutions, 
p 83 and Freyer, Antitrust and Global Capitalism, pp 361-363. 
47 Baxt, R. “Forum” (1989) Trade Practices Commission Bulletin No 49 p 1 at 3. 
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always be forthcoming. If so, more serious regulatory solutions would be sought 
(undertakings or court actions).
48
 
 
Thus, for example, the Commission found evidence that a subsidiary of Pacific 
Dunlop Ltd, GBN Australia Ltd, had placed „Made in Australia‟ labels on imported 
batteries. The Commission entered into a formal court-enforceable undertaking with 
Pacific Dunlop and GBN Australia in return for the companies embarking on a wide-
ranging compliance program to be monitored by a leading law firm.
49
  
 
A similar approach was adopted in relation to Toshiba Australia after the company 
admitted engaging in resale price maintenance (RPM). It gave a court-enforceable 
undertaking to implement long-term compliance training for its staff.
50
 The 
Commission was concerned at the level of RPM in the computer industry at the 
time.
51
 The agreement obliged Toshiba to submit to at least three years of a 
comprehensive, trade practices compliance training program covering its executives 
and relevant sales staff. In addition, Toshiba undertook to write to all of its resellers 
telling them that they had the right to discount prices. This was seen as a more 
effective market solution to the problem since the low level of penalties had not 
served as an effective deterrent. 
 
The enforcement strategy was applied in relation to breaches of the consumer 
protection laws as well as the competition laws. The Commission would not always 
agree to settle breaches by the acceptance of undertakings. It had recourse to litigation 
if this was felt to be necessary to get its point across. For example, it instituted 
proceedings against two major home builders, for misleading conduct and 
unconscionable conduct in relation to home buyers because the problem was thought 
to be widespread and serious.  
 
On 29 September 1988, proceedings were commenced against Kimberley Homes, a 
major New South Wales home builder, alleging that it had required home buyers to 
pay a deposit of $1,000 and sign a blank contract for building work if they wanted to 
secure a 90 day fixed price tender. The Commission claimed that, after the blank 
contract was signed, the company deliberately delayed finalisation of the agreement 
until after the 90 day period had expired so that it was no longer bound by its fixed 
price tender and could demand more for various „extras‟ that were said to be required. 
On 10 August 1989 the matter was settled with Kimberley Homes agreeing to pay 
compensation of $35,000 to four families.
52
 
 
On 30 June 1989, proceedings were commenced against Manfal Pty Ltd alleging six 
contraventions of s 52A. Manfal contracted with consumers to build houses for a 
fixed price, but subsequently during the building process, demanded additional 
                                                 
48 For a consideration of the advantages of formal and informal settlements compared with court 
proceedings see Asher, Trade Practices Offenders..  
49 See Freyer, Antitrust and Global Capitalism. 
50 For the terms of the formal agreement see Trade Practices Commission, Training instead of 
prosecution.  
51 See Trade Practices Commission v Commodore Business Machines Pty Ltd (1990) 92 ALR 563 
penalties of $250,000 were imposed for 19 instances of  RPM where Commodore made threats to 
cancel dealerships and withheld supply to dealers who advertised computers below the recommended 
retail price. 
52 Trade Practices Commission, Bulletin No 49 p 18. 
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payments above the contract price before continuing the work. Manfal eventually 
went into liquidation. 
53
 
 
The Commission designed an integrated information strategy to reinforce these court 
cases so that the standard of compliance in the home building industry throughout 
Australia would improve. 
 
Corporate Compliance Education 
 
Baxt did not perceive his role as the head of a statutory authority charged with 
enforcing the law as simply that of a policeman; he wanted to be pro-active and seek 
to educate the business community about its responsibilities under the TPA.
54
 
 
In 1991 the Commission developed a compliance program for the Metal Trade 
Industry Association which was launched by the Attorney-General, Michael Duffy, on 
18 March 1991, and subsequently persuaded a large number of companies to adopt it 
with the ultimate aim being business self-regulation. This was the first time that a 
coherent compliance program had been developed and published by the 
Commission.
55
 Baxt realised that competition/ consumer protection law system would 
derive its effectiveness not just from the TPC pursuing its enforcement strategy, but 
from those in business undertaking voluntary compliance. He wanted to persuade 
business people through reasoned argument of the underlying policy rationale for the 
law, so that they too saw it as desirable and would, in consequence, embark upon a 
program of voluntary trade practices compliance.  
 
He established the ACCC Consultative Committee consisting of the various 
stakeholder groups, Law Council of Australia, Business Council of Australia, trade 
associations and consumer groups as a forum to gather information about how the 
TPA was working and to respond to criticisms. He realised the important role that 
these institutions played in educating their members as to their rights and 
responsibilities under the TPA. They also disseminated information about recent 
developments; analysed critically the principal judgments and administrative 
determinations; and participated in the process of law reform.  
 
 
Baxt actively pursued the development of industry Codes of Practice, and industry –
wide self-regulatory schemes.
56
 The aim was to deliver durable improvements in 
market place efficiency rather than short-term, „band-aid‟ solutions. 
 
In 1988, the Commission published its three volume report into self-regulation in 
industry and the professions.
57
 It was based on a four year study of almost 500 self 
regulation arrangements administered by industry associations. The report concluded 
that that the scope for effective self-regulation varied considerably from industry to 
industry and that the decision on whether a code of conduct was appropriate for a 
                                                 
53 Trade Practices Commission, Bulletin No 55, p32.  
54 Hansard (Senate) 15 October 1991, p 2012. 
55 Trade Practices Commission, Objectives, Priorities and Work Program for 1988-1989. See also the 
Trade Practices Commission, Annual Report 1988-89, pp 8-9, and 43-57. 
56 Tamblyn, Industry Codes, p 3. 
57 Trade Practices Commission, Self-regulation in Australian Industry. 
 15 
particular industry would depend on whether it was likely to produce desirable 
outcomes such as consumer benefit, enhanced industry efficiency or increased 
competition. 
 
At the request of the Senator Bolkus, the Commonwealth Minister for Consumer 
Affairs, the Commission consulted with the Australian Retailers‟ Association and 
consumer representatives on the development of a national code of conduct for 
supermarkets using computerised checkout systems. An agreed code was 
implemented in August 1989 (Bar Code Scanning Code). 
 
In December 1988, the Commission participated in an evaluation of the Electronic 
Funds Transfer (EFT) Code of Conduct (EFT Code).  
 
It also assisted the petroleum industry in the development and implementation of an 
industry code of conduct for negotiating disputes between oil companies and their 
resellers (Petrol Marketing Code). 
 
The Commission was responsible for monitoring the advertising codes of the Media 
Council of Australia. The codes came into effect on 1 June 1989, after their 
authorisation by the Trade Practices Tribunal in December 1988. In its decision the 
Tribunal indicated that the Commission should have a continuing role in monitoring 
the operation of the codes and ensuring that the conditions the Tribunal imposed were 
complied with.  
Background Papers and Industry Studies 
Baxt engaged experts outside the Commission to prepare Background Papers which 
set out to explain the law in relation to some of the more complex and difficult areas: 
 Misuse of Market Power 58 
 Intellectual Property59 
 Unconscionable Conduct.60 
In its 1988-89 Priorities Statement, the Commission announced its intention to 
publish a paper on the implications of the Trade Practices Act for the professions‟ 
covering both consumer and competition issues and opening up the professions to 
competition where possible.‟61 The aim of the study was to examine regulatory 
arrangements that had an impact on professional services markets, to help stimulate 
informed debate on the broad subject of the state of competition within the 
professions, and to inform the professions themselves about competition law. 
 
At the time de-regulation and micro-economic reform was becoming widespread. 
There was a high degree of community awareness that other sectors were being 
deregulated and forced to face the discipline of market competition and people were 
asking why the professions should not be subject to the same economic pressures. The 
                                                 
58 Trade Practices Commission, Misuse of Market Power. 
59 Trade Practices Commission, Application of the Trade Practices Act to Intellectual Property. 
60 Trade Practices Commission, Unconscionable Conduct Background Paper. 
61 Trade Practices Commission, Objectives, Priorities and Work Program for 1988-1989, p 14. This 
intention was re-affirmed. See Trade Practices Commission, Objectives, Priorities and Work Program 
for 1989-1990, p 18. 
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professions resisted the commission‟s study. They saw it as an attack on the 
professions, and Baxt had to work hard to convince them that he had no such purpose 
in mind.
62
 Baxt commented that: 
 
We engaged in the study of the professions and we felt that this was a way to 
educate the community – the accounting, the legal, the medical professions – 
as to why competition law was important; why it was important to get rid of 
restrictive practices.  Of course, there was the classic story of the Law Council 
writing to Lionel Bowen and asking him to direct me to stop the Commission 
conducting this research.  Lionel had a meeting with me and at the end of the 
meeting, he said: ―By the way, I‘ve got this letter from the Law Council. Can 
you draft a suitable reply to go to them?‖ I was absolutely delighted to do 
that. The accounting profession was very co-operative. The Victorian Law 
Institute was fantastically supportive, as against the Law Council which was 
very negative.  The medical profession were very funny. They kept saying to 
us: ―Yes, we think this enquiry of the professions is entirely appropriate, 
except for the medical profession.‖63 
 
Relationship with Staff 
 
Baxt realised that the TPC‟s effectiveness in the area of enforcement and compliance 
depended on the professionalism of its staff. Baxt‟s style within the TPC was 
markedly different from that of McComas. Whereas McComas would only have 
regular contact with a few very senior people, Baxt made a point of making greater 
personal contact with middle managers and the staff responsible for investigations and 
enforcement.  
 
Baxt tried to raise professional standards within the Commission:  
 
We started to look more aggressively for university student scholarships 
within the Commission. …Because there were a lot of very traditional public 
servants that worked in the Commission and had been there a long time and 
perhaps had not thought about the Trade Practices Act as having a broader 
effect on the market rather than simply stopping price fixing. So it was good to 
see the way in which the Commission started to attract brighter academics. 
64
  
 
Baxt unlike his predecessors, Bannerman and McComas, sat on staff selection and 
promotion committees to ensure that the Commission recruited and promoted the staff 
based on their ability and performance and not merely on the length of tenure in the 
job. Baxt was far more outgoing than his predecessors in visiting the Commission‟s 
regional offices. Bob McComas never travelled north to Brisbane, Townsville or 
Darwin. Baxt was more consultative with his staff: under McComas there was only 
one meeting a year with the senior management; under Baxt there were regular 
meetings with senior and middle managers. 
 
                                                 
62 See, e.g., Baxt‟s address to the general meeting of the Australian Council of the Professions, 
„Competition in the Market for Professional Services‟ presented at National Surveyors‟ House, Deakin, 
ACT of 26 April 1990 and Dinner Address, NSW Law Week, 30 April 1990. 
63 Baxt, 2007 Interview, p 6. 
64 Baxt, 2004 Interview, pp 15-16. 
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It is important to recognise the crucial role played by Hank Spier, who as the General 
Manager of the Commission, played a crucial role in acting as liaison between the 
Baxt and his Commission and the staff, both senior and junior.  Spier‟s intimate 
knowledge of, and experience with, the Canberra bureaucracy and its political masters 
would prove time and time again to be invaluable to Baxt, who as an academic was 
not easily attuned to these institutions. Spier also played a key link for Baxt between 
the Commission's Central office in Canberra and its far-flung regional offices. 
  
 
 
ADMINISTRATION AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE LAW 
 
Another criticism that Baxt levelled at McComas was his failure to run test cases to 
allow the courts to interpret the law to see whether it was effective. Baxt was keen to 
test the law, especially the two key prohibitions – s 50 which prohibited mergers that 
created or strengthened a dominant position in a market, and s 46 which prohibited 
the taking advantage of a position of substantial market power for a proscribed anti-
competitive purpose. 
 
Baxt commented: 
 
Let me say that I believed very strongly that one of the things that you had to 
do was apply the law that you had as effectively as you could.  So the question 
was: did we have a merger law that could work?  Did we have a Section 46 
that could work?  …The important thing was to run the cases…65 
 
Mergers 
 
One of the most controversial areas of the law during Baxt‟s time as Chairman of the 
Commission was the regulation of mergers. The dominance threshold in s 50 was 
thought to be necessary to allow firms to grow to a sufficient size to achieve 
economies of scale.  
As explained above, the Commission ran two major cases, Trade Practices 
Commission v Arnotts, 66 and Trade Practices Commission v Australia Meat 
Holdings67 to test the effectiveness of the law. The Commission was successful in 
both cases. 
Horizontal agreements  
 
Baxt launched a major cartel investigation against TNT and Mayne Nickless in 
relation to the express freight market. This was essentially a re-run of the Tradestock  
case.
68
 Although the conduct at issue was different, it involved some of the same 
companies.  
 
                                                 
65      Baxt, 2007 Interview, p7. 
66 (1990) ATPR 41-062. 
67 Trade Practices Commission v Australia Meat Holdings Ltd  (1988) 83 ALR 299. 
68      Trade Practices Commission v TNT Management Pty Ltd (1985) ATPR 40-512. 
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The action was again hard fought with the parties taking every conceivable point to 
draw out the proceedings and wear down the TPC. This time the TPC engaged 
Charles Sweeney QC who knew the tactics having fought hard against the 
Commission in the first Tradestock case.  
 
TPC was ultimately successful and substantial pecuniary penalties were imposed in 
TPC v TNT Australia Pty Ltd. 
69
 The Commission had come a long way in terms of its 
ability to fight complex litigation since the first Tradestock case. 
 
Misuse of market power 
 
Section 46 of the TPA which prohibits a corporation taking advantage of substantial 
market power for an anti-competitive purpose is one of the pivotal provisions of 
Pt IV.  
 
Baxt was critical of the failure by McComas to respond to the request made by 
Queensland Wire Industries (QWI) to intervene in its dispute with BHP. Baxt was 
concerned that it should be tested in the courts: 
 
The thing that struck me immediately – and it sort of happened almost 
simultaneously with my appointment – was that the Commission had not run 
the Queensland Wire case.  Why had they not run the case? This seemed to me 
the most obvious case to test the law.  One of the things that regulators have to 
do, (and it is bad luck in a sense for the companies that get targeted as a test 
case) is sometimes you have to run a test case.  You don‘t do it vindictively. 
You do it on the basis that you‘ve got a reasonably good case to run.  The 
Commission did not want to run that case… I said at the time of my 
appointment… one of the first things I was going to do was to get leave to 
appeal in the High Court which we failed to do, in essence, legally, but we 
didn‘t fail to do, in essence, practically, because we got Goldberg and Shavin 
to go to the Court argue the points and the points were picked up by [Counsel 
for Queensland Wire].
70
 
   
 
The claim by Baxt is borne out if one compares the arguments raised Counsel for the 
Commission and the reasons given for the decision in the High Court. The primary 
judge (Pincus J) had dismissed the application by QWI which alleged that the sole 
Australian manufacturer of Y-bar used to manufacture star picket fence posts had 
taken advantage of its market power in the market for steel products to deter or 
prevent QWI from engaging in competitive conduct in the market for rural fencing 
products, contrary to s 46(1) of the TPA. The Full Federal Court (Bowen CJ, Morling 
and Gummow JJ) upheld the dismissal. 
 
Counsel for the Commission were careful to set out the Commission‟s preferred 
interpretation of the „taking advantage‟ element of s 46 in their written submission to 
the Court, so that even if the application was unsuccessful, the High Court would have 
had the benefit of considering it. It is interesting to note how closely some of the 
                                                 
69      (1995) ATPR 41-375. 
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judgments followed the Commission‟s submissions in relation the „taking advantage‟ 
element of s46.  
 
Counsel for the Commission argued: 
 
The question the [Full Federal Court] should have asked is: What is the source 
of BHP's power to prevent QWI competing with it in the market for star picket 
fencing by denying it the supply of Y-bar? 
 
At the same time one asks is that behaviour or conduct constrained by anyone 
else? Putting the matter another way - why can it refuse to supply Y-bar? The 
answer is that it is not constrained by anyone else and that it refuses to supply 
Y-bar because it knows no other company will supply it. If there was another 
supplier, actual or potential (in that it had manufacturing capability to 
produce Y-bar if it wished to so use its plant), BHP would want to supply the 
Y-bar because it is in the business of maximising sales and profits and 
otherwise it would lose the business to someone else.  
 
BHP, assuming for present purposes, that it has an intention to maximise 
profits, can only refuse to supply QWI with impunity if it is confident that QWI 
cannot obtain supplies of Y-bar from any other source. If it was not so 
confident, BHP would run the risk that it would lose not only sales of Y-bar to 
QWI but also ultimate sales of star pickets.  
 
The alternative sources of Y-bar can only be those companies (if any) who 
presently manufacture Y-bar or, who because they manufacture general steel 
products have a present capacity, with very little effort, to substitute for the 
manufacture and supply of their existing product, the manufacture and supply 
of Y-bar. This is what the economists have described as supply substitution 
and which Dr Norman, the economist called by BHP, conceded was relevant.  
 
Thus it is only if BHP has a substantial degree of power in the market for 
general steel products that it will be able to prevent or constrain the entry by 
QWI into the star picket market by refusing to supply to it Y-bar. Pincus J 
found that BHP had a substantial degree of power in this market.
71
 
 
These submissions of the Commission are reflected in the reasons of Deane J who 
acknowldged: 
 
‗The Trade Practices Commission has effectively drawn the Court's attention 
to the matters which it considered should be raised.  That being so, no real 
point would be served by granting it leave to intervene at this stage.‘72 
 
Toohey J also noted: 
…submissions by the Commission as to the proper construction and operation 
of the Act were largely taken up by counsel for Q.W.I. and have been dealt 
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with in these reasons.  In the circumstances, no particular purpose would be 
served by acceding to the Commission's application.
73
 
 
Baxt was delighted with the outcome. The High Court handed down its decision on 8 
February 1989. In his Ruby Hutchinson Memorial Address delivered on 16 March 
1989 Baxt commented: 
 
In the Queensland Wire case the Commission intervened (some would say very 
successfully even though no formal recognition was given to our role) because 
it was felt that the courts needed to hear our views as to how the Act should 
operate in a vital and strategic area of the law (the sections dealing with 
misuse of market power).
74
 
 
On 23 December 1988, the TPC commenced proceedings against CSR Ltd seeking an 
injunction and pecuniary penalties for breaches of s 46 and s 47 of the TPA. Until 
early 1988 CSR was the sole supplier of plasterboard in Western Australia. At that 
time its largest customer was North Perth Plasterworks Pty Ltd.  
Both resulted in penalties being imposed for contraventions of s 46, although in 
Baxt‟s view the penalties were „were so miniscule as to make it a bit of a joke.‘ 75  
 
Increased use of s 155 powers 
 
In conducting its investigations the Commission generally relied on written request 
for information, but Baxt was concerned that there was too much „hiding behind 
corporations‟. He wanted to make those responsible for corporations to be directly 
accountable for their actions. The Commission under Baxt, began to make more 
frequent use of s 155(1)(c), the power to interrogate those suspected of contravening 
the TPA. Baxt commented: 
 
One of the things that the Commission started to use, when I was there, which 
had only just been used once or twice, was the individual 155(1)(c)s where 
you‘d bring people in for questioning. We started to use those quite 
significantly because we found that that was a way of separating the 
companies from the individuals. That‘s one of the great fallacies of modern 
commercial law in this country. Everyone thinks that the company is a 
separate being and not enough attention is paid to the individuals that run the 
company…the particular individuals that are responsible for the breaches of 
the relevant legislation.
76
 
 
The parties under investigation sought to challenge the use by the Commission of 
these powers. The Full Court of the Federal Court in SA Brewing Holdings Ltd v 
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Baxt 77 held that there were two preconditions for the valid exercise of s 155 by the 
ACCC: first, a matter which may constitute a contravention; and secondly, a 
reasonable belief by the Chairperson or Deputy Chairperson that the person named in 
the notice is capable of assisting the ACCC in its investigation. 
  
Authorisation process 
 
Soon after Baxt took office in April 1988, he announced a changed approach to the 
TPC‟s administration of the merger provisions: in future, the Commission would be 
giving greater emphasis to the authorisation process in mergers with potential market 
dominance to ensure that the process of assessing any net public benefits was exposed 
to public scrutiny.
78
   
 
The Commission had to consider a number of large scale mergers during Baxt‟s term 
as Chairman. In Ardmona Fruit Products Co-op. Ltd, Letona Co-op. Co, Ltd and 
S.P.C. Ltd
79
 the proposed merger would have resulted in the parties having a 
combined market share of 90 per cent of the market for deciduous canned fruits. The 
TPC granted an authorisation since the proposed merger could bring about significant 
cost savings in the production and marketing of deciduous canned fruit through the 
more efficient utilisation of plant and equipment and staff, thus making the merged 
entity more internationally competitive. 
 
In Fletcher Challenge Ltd 
80
 the TPC granted authorisation in respect of the 
acquisition by Fletcher Challenge of 50 per cent of Australian Newsprint Mills, which 
would result in Fletcher Challenge dominating the Australian market for the 
production and supply of newsprint. Australian Newsprint Mills was the sole 
Australian manufacturer of newsprint and was by far the major source of newsprint to 
Australian publishers, supplying some 65 per cent of the total market. Fletcher 
Challenge supplied some 23 per cent of the Australian newsprint market. However, 
the TPC recognised significant public benefits in the form of a more efficient 
Australian-based newsprint production industry, increased production capacity, 
import replacement and possible export of Australian-produced newsprint.
81
 
 
Another significant merger was that between Australian Mining & Smelting Ltd, a 
wholly owned subsidiary of CRA Ltd and North Broken Hill Holdings Ltd. The 
merger would result in Pasminco being the sole producer and place it in a position to 
dominate the Australian market for the supply of refined zinc and lead. 
 
Once again Baxt suggested that the parties seek authorisation so that the process of 
assessing the net public benefits could be exposed to public scrutiny. 
 
Baxt commented: 
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Pasminco was a critical merger that the companies wanted. I remember 
having a meeting with John Button [Senator John Button, the Minister for 
Industry, Technology and Commerce] and John certainly did not try to 
influence the Commission but he said: ―I just want to talk to you about some 
things. I think this is a very important merger, and I hope you are going to 
look at it in that way‖. I didn‘t feel under any threat that the government was 
sort of pushing us one way or another.
 82
   
 
In Pasminco Ltd 
83
 the TPC granted an authorisation since the merger would enhance 
the Australian companies‟ international competitiveness through rationalisation and 
production synergies.
84
 The added value of the concentrates for export was a 
significant pubic benefit. However, the TPC was concerned that if Pasminco operate 
as the sole supplier to the domestic market, neither the availability of s 46 of the TPA, 
nor the threat of imports would act as sufficient checks on its market power. 
Accordingly, it required Pasminco to market its zinc in Australia through the two 
independent marketing arms of CRA and North Broken Hill. 
 
As discussed below, the Commission dismissed the Western Australian Newspaper‟s 
application for authorisation.
 
In West Australian Newspapers (No 2) 
85
 concluded that 
insufficient public benefits would result form the proposed acquisition to out-weigh 
the anti-competitive detriment. While it acknowledged that there could possibly be 
loss of  employment, redundancy packages and seniority resulting from the closure of 
the Daily News if WAN‟s application was denied, the grant of an authorisation would 
result in the creation of a dominant firm that would make competitive entry into the 
Perth market by a new metropolitan daily paper very difficult. 
 
We asked Baxt whether he thought that his increased emphasis on authorisation for 
mergers was a success. Baxt replied: 
 
It was just too slow; too inefficient. The Commission always had difficulty in 
dealing with this area because this is the guts of the work of the Commission if 
it‘s going to be a true economic regulator. Where you are looking at some of 
these issues, you really have to test the arguments… because you are testing it 
in the context of the non-determinative penalty type regime. So, it‘s much 
easier to talk about these things in a neutral fashion. You really do need to get 
economists and others who work in these disciplines, to really test out some of 
these arguments. I don‘t think it was an area that the Commission handled as 
well as it should have. It was far too slow.
86
 
 
Consumer Protection 
 
Baxt acknowledged the leadership role taken by Allan Asher in relation to the 
enforcement of the consumer protection laws: 
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Allan kept pushing me. I mean I felt that consumer protection was a critical 
issue for him because the consumers were being you know ripped off all sorts 
of different ways.
87
 
 
 
At the time there was a separation of Ministerial responsibilities between the 
Attorney-General and the Minister of Consumer Protection (Senator Nick Bolkus) 
who was responsible for a separate Federal Bureau of Consumer Affairs. 
 
Baxt was concerned about the prevalence of business scams and get-rich-quick 
schemes
88
 but lack of co-operation and co-ordination and competition for resources 
between the Commission and the Federal Bureau. His attempts to enforce the 
consumer protection provisions were hampered by a lack of resources and a lack of 
cooperation and coordination between the State and commonwealth agencies. 
 
When asked whether he thought that the Commission had been an effective regulator 
of consumer protection during his term, he paid tribute to his fellow Commissioner, 
Allan Asher, who assumed primary responsibility for that area of the TPA: 
 
We had a real problem with consumer protection. We had this department 
within the Attorney-General‘s [the Federal Bureau of Consumer Affairs] that 
was in charge of consumer protection. …We had a Minister who is now 
retired, Senator Nick Bolkus. Nick gave me a very, very hard time. Allan Asher 
was the primary culprit here because Allan kept pushing me. I felt that 
consumer protection was a critical issue for him because consumers were 
being ripped off in all sorts of different ways.  
 
One of the great problems we have with our Act …Part V doesn‘t carry 
basically any serious penalties. …most of it is misleading and deceptive 
conduct type stuff with a few minor areas where you can pick up criminal 
sanctions. You get these scams set up and they‘d set up a company to run the 
scam. You‘d get a court order against them and they‘d start up another 
company the next day. You‘d have to do it all over again. It was just so 
frustrating.  
 
 Allan was very keen that we start to play a more effective role in trying to co-
ordinate a national approach to some of these things and I remember we put 
out a paper. I was very naïve. We put out a paper in relation to this and the 
guys in the [Federal Bureau of Consumer Affairs] in the AG‘s department 
went to complain to me and read me the riot act.
89
 
 
The Commission was hampered by a lack of resources to provide the level of 
consumer protection required. 
 
Baxt noted: 
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Because of  the limited resources the Commission took the hard decision to 
limit our involvement in business scams, such ass the get rich quick schemes, 
franchising rorts(especially in relation to such schemes) and areas such as 
land sales. No sooner would the Commission succeed in stoping one such 
activity (even with well publicised court cases) and other would crop up to 
frustrate and blunt the successes of the past.
90
 
 
Nevertheless, Baxt sought to bring cases to cases in the hope that the courts would 
impose significant fines.  In the Kingly Commodities case, 
91
 a get-rich-quick-scheme 
involving investments in futures commodities, the defendants were convicted of four 
charges and Pincus J imposed fines of $144,000. The deterrent effect of such a finding 
was important to the Commission, but Baxt recognised that there were limits to the 
cost-effectiveness of this sort of enforcement, given the Commission‟s limited 
resources. 
 
CREATING MORE EFFECTIVE LAWS AND POLICY DEVELOPMENT 
 
While Baxt‟s main concern was with the day-to-day running of the Commission, 
enforcement and compliance, he was also genuinely concerned about the importance 
of drafting laws in a way that they could readily be understood and enforced.
92
 He 
saw his role as not simply confined to enforcing the law, but as a champion and 
advocate for competition policy more broadly. This was in stark contrast to his 
predecessors, especially the first Chairman, Ron Bannerman, who, in the early years 
of the Commission‟s existence when Government financial support was vital, was 
careful to ensure that that the Commission was not seen to be anything other than a 
neutral administrator.
93
 
 
Baxt’s role in the Policy Debate 
 
At this time the effectiveness of the TPA as an instrument for promoting competition 
was circumscribed by its limited coverage. It was essentially confined to the 
regulation of the conduct of corporations and had been enacted primarily in reliance 
on the „corporations power‟ in the Australian Constitution.94 Thus, the conduct of 
natural persons, including the professions and sole traders, were essentially outside 
the ambit of the TPA. Also excluded, was the conduct of State and Territory 
government-owned businesses that enjoyed shield of the Crown. It was possible for 
exemptions to be granted to other areas of business by regulation made under the TPA 
itself, or by other Commonwealth, State or Territory laws or regulations. 
 
Baxt actively promoted a change in policy in favour of the universal application of the 
of the competition provisions of the TPA. Thus, for example, in his Ruby Hutchinson 
Memorial Address, Baxt advocated extending the reach of the TPA to ensure its 
application to the operations of government business enterprises and significant areas 
of the private sector including the professions: 
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I want finally to say a little about the desirability of extending the reach of the 
Trade Practices Act – to ensure its application to the operations of 
Government enterprises, trade unions and activities not of an interstate trade 
and commerce nature. This can be achieved through the agreement of the 
States and Territories to incorporate complementary legislation, or by the 
Commonwealth Government moving to try out legislation in the hope that the 
courts will read the constitutional powers of the Commonwealth more 
widely….Whichever route is taken will require the co-operation of different 
groups within the community, and in many cases a departure from historically 
strongly entrenched positions. 
95
 
 
The same message was delivered in the Trade Practices Commission‟s Annual Report 
1989-90: 
 
As the detail of this report indicates, the Act is a powerful tool. However, the 
Commission has continually emphasised the need for it to apply equally and 
without discrimination throughout the community and for it to be administered 
without fear or favour. The commission could achieve a good deal more but 
for a combination of factors presenting significant impediments to the 
expression of this philosophy in practice. These include: 
 The limitations on the Commonwealth‘s constitutional powers to 
regulate the activities of non-corporations; 
 The insulation of many Commonwealth, State and Territory bodies 
form the Act by shield of the crown or specific legislation; 
 The exemption form the Act, by specific Commonwealth, State or 
Territory legislation or regulation, of much anticompetitive conduct in 
the non-government sector; and 
 The lack of attention to the market power of unions which sometimes 
engage in actions which affect market behaviour.
96
 
 
Universal coverage of the TPA 
 
One of Baxt‟s major achievements was that he was instrumental in persuading the 
Prime Minister‟s Department to start the process that led to the Hilmer reforms.97 
 
Baxt commented: 
 
I was very concerned that the Act didn‘t apply to a whole range of various 
things that it should and I thought that I should try and persuade politicians to 
try to widen the lengths of the Act through talking to State governments. That 
was one of my achievements; that I persuaded the Prime Minister‘s 
Department to actually start the process which led to the Hilmer Report. 
Michael Duffy, the Attorney-General, was totally opposed to that. Not because 
he didn‘t believe that the Act should apply to State activities, but he thought 
there was absolutely no way the State Governments would agree to it: ―Why 
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should we bash our heads against a brick wall?‖ I said: ―Michael, you‘ve got 
to try. You‘ve got to make this Act work. It‘s got to be universal. This has got 
to be the sole piece of legislation in the competition area in this country. You 
can‘t have these bits and pieces.‖ 
 
And I can remember ringing him the day that Bob Hawke…published 
[„Building a Competitive Australia‟ 12 March 1991] and one of the issues of 
that policy document was the fact that there was going to be a national 
approach to competition law. I remember saying to Michael: ―This is 
fantastic.‖ He said: ―It‘s a bloody stupid idea. Who the bloody hell said to put 
this through?‖98 
 
Which Government Department should be responsible for competition policy? 
 
Baxt was also concerned about the lack of a coherent micro-economic reform policy 
with decisions apparently being taken by the Government on an ad hoc basis. 
99
  
 
Baxt commented:  
 
I lobbied to move the Commission to Treasury… The lawyers at AGs didn‘t 
understand competition policy. I really don‘t think they saw it as the broader 
policy regime that it is. I think they saw it as these little compartmentalised 
breaches. It‘s again a criticism I have of lawyers as a broad group that we 
tend to be very narrow and not lateral in our thinking. We‘re not interactive 
and so on. I think that‘s true of a number of our pieces of legislation where we 
don‘t work with other disciplines to legislate. A classic example of that was 
the fact that I felt that there hadn‘t been enough attention paid to the 
interaction between competition law and intellectual property law. There were 
these exemptions in s 51 which we pinched from the English legislation and 
we just copied them. We hadn‘t given any thought as to how they worked.100 
 
There was overlap between Commonwealth, State and Territory laws in the area of 
consumer protection. There was overlap between the TPC and the Australian 
Broadcasting Tribunal in the area of media law. The Commission needed to meet with 
the Department of Transport over deregulation in the domestic airline sector and its 
integration with the TPA.
101
 
 
Baxt commented: 
 
When the Attorney-General‘s Department learned about these particular 
initiatives its reaction was one of horror. What was the Trade Practices 
Commission doing getting involved in policy! When I explained to them what 
we were trying to do – trying to co-ordinate scarce resources in dealing with 
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situations that overlapped or were clearly creating gaps, causing problems for 
the consuming public – silence was their answer.102 
 
Throughout his term, Baxt was critical of the lack of support he received from the 
Attorney-General‟s Department, not just in terms of funding, but in terms of its 
willingness to look at competition policy in an integrated way with other government 
policy. Baxt noted: 
 
The Attorney-General‘s Department has, in my respectful view, been far too 
reactive to Government initiatives; and often the reaction is too slow, and 
regrettably unimaginative. The Attorney-General, Michael Duffy, who has 
been a very progressive Minister in a number of other areas, needs time to 
devote to developing his and the government‘s thinking in this area – he 
should be allowed to take a leadership role in this area.
103
  
 
Baxt was not averse to criticising the government publicly on policy matters. We 
asked Baxt whether it was appropriate for the head of a statutory authority to advising 
the Government on matters of policy:  
 
 It‘s clear that the Government cannot formulate policy in a vacuum. It has to 
have the people who administer the law, those that have the hands-on 
experience and know how it operates, providing input. The people in the 
Attorney-General‘s Department work extremely hard and are very able in 
their own right , but they don‘t have, and they can‘t get, the kind of experience 
that we have by talking to people. What we have to offer Mr Duffy, and I think 
he fully realises it, is the way in which these policies in black and white really 
work in practice.
104
 
 
Baxt commented on his attempts to get the government to develop a coherent 
competition policy: 
 
But it was very frustrating. It was continually frustrating; the unwillingness 
for the Government to tackle the harder questions. The most frustrating thing 
was that you knew that you had such a good argument on your side in order to 
push this debate, and push the parameters…I got so frustrated by the 
unwillingness of the Government to support the Commission‘s push that I 
actually got John Adey [Assistant Commissioner, Compliance Information 
Branch] to set up a Press Club lunch for me to make a speech at the end of it. I 
really bloody stood up. I really let them have it.
105
 
 
 
Baxt reprimanded 
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Baxt‟s criticisms of the Government‟s failure to provide adequate resources to enable 
it to fulfil its obligations and its failure to develop a coherent competition policy did 
not go unnoticed by the Government.  
 
Matters came to a head at the TPC‟s Senior Management Conference held at the 
Paradise Wirrina Cove Resort near Cape Jervis, South Australia, from 26-30 
November 1990.  John Broome and Stephen Skehill from the Commonwealth 
Attorney-General‟s Department attended the conference. John Broome was at the 
time First Assistant Secretary, Business Affairs, in the Attorney-General‟s 
Department.  Skehill was a portfolio manager within the Attorney-General‟s 
Department.  As a Ministerial adviser Broome, kept a close watch on Baxt‟s activities. 
At the 1990 Conference, Broome was critical of Baxt‟s intrusion into policy matters. 
This culminated in all of the Commissioners being summoned by the Government to 
Canberra to have a robust discussion with the Attorney-General about whose role it 
was to engage in policy formulation. 
 
Broome continued to monitor the activities of the Commission and to advise the 
Attorney-General in relation to Commission decisions that might cause political 
embarrassment. In 1990, Daily News Pty Ltd, the publisher of the daily afternoon 
newspaper in Perth faced insolvency. West Australian Newspapers Ltd (WAN), the 
publisher of the only morning newspaper in Perth, made an offer to acquire Daily 
News. Baxt formed the view that such an acquisition by WAN would place it in a 
position to dominate the market for metropolitan newspapers in Perth.  
 
Unless it was sold as going concern to WAN, the Daily News employees (members of 
the Print Union) would be laid off. Baxt made it clear to WAN that it would have to 
apply for an authorisation and that the acquisition would have to be assessed in an 
open and transparent way after full consultation with all the parties who were likely to 
be affected. There would be no secret deals behind closed doors. 
 
The unions put pressure on the Labor Government to exert its influence on the 
Commission to authorise the acquisition and prevent job losses. Baxt recalled: 
 
I remember John [Broome], when he was in Duffy‘s office, really getting me 
very angry in relation to the Western Australian Newspapers matter. We 
would not approve the sale.  We said the only way you can get it approved is 
go for an authorisation and try your luck on that.  I remember this like today 
where Broome said to Duffy – it was very political; great agitation – ―You just 
have to direct Baxt to do this. It‘s going to be a great embarrassment to you.‖ 
To Duffy‘s credit he stood by me. Broome did not like political 
embarrassments. I mean he was looking after his Minister. He was doing the 
right thing by the Minister.
106
  
 
The Commission ultimately dismissed the Western Australian Newspaper‟s 
application for authorisation.
107
 Baxt believed he was accountable for the 
Commission‟s decision and showed considerable courage in attending a meeting of 
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openly hostile print workers. At the meeting he sought to explain the logic of the 
Commission‟s determination and was heckled and jostled by the workers who would 
be laid off as a result of it. 
 
Subsequently, the Hawke and Keating Labor Governments became the champions of 
micro-economic reform and deregulation. The Hawke government released a major 
policy document, “Building a Competitive Australia” on 12 March 1991 just prior to 
Baxt‟s departure on 30 June 1991, which resulted in the establishment on an 
Independent Committee of Inquiry, (the Hilmer Committee), in October 1992, to 
report on the changes that would be needed to introduce an effective national 
competition policy in Australia.
108
  
 
Under Prime Minister Paul Keating, the responsibility for the administration of the 
TPA shifted from the Attorney-General‟s Department to the Department of Treasury 
with the enactment of the Competition Policy Reform Act 1995 (Cth). This was a 
vindication of Baxt‟s position, but it came only after he had left the Commission. 
 
EVALUATING THE ROLE OF ROBERT BAXT  
 
The Annual Reports provide a comprehensive record of Baxt‟s achievements during 
his term as Chairman of the TPC. However, what may not be so obvious from the 
Annual Reports is the crucial role that Baxt played in transforming the Commission 
into a more effective enforcement agency, and in reforming the law.   
 
First, Baxt took a conscious decision to break with the laissez faire approach of his 
predecessor Bob McComas and the behind-the-scenes deals on mergers. Transparency 
and accountability would be the hallmarks of his administration. He immediately gave 
effect to them in the way in which mergers were assessed. He insisted on the 
authorisation process for assessing mergers with potential market dominance to 
ensure that the likely impact on competition and any net public benefits was exposed 
to public scrutiny.  
 
He consciously set out develop a coherent enforcement strategy which was then 
widely publicised. Each year he settled on the Commission‟s Objectives and Priorities 
for the year ahead, and widely publicised them. He sought to persuade business 
people through reasoned argument of the importance of the underlying policy 
objectives of the TPA in a free market economy, and thereby convince them to 
undertake voluntary compliance. 
 
Secondly, Baxt adopted a coherent and integrated approach to enforcement. He 
actively set out to test the existing law to determine whether it was workable and 
effective especially in relation to the dominance test for mergers and misuse of market 
power. The enforcement pyramid approach aimed to gain widespread compliance 
with the TPA on a limited budget. In such circumstances litigation was not necessarily 
the most effective means of obtaining compliance.  
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Litigation had to be reserved for the most serious breaches of the TPA. In other, less 
serious cases negotiated settlements and court enforceable undertakings were 
negotiated. In 1988-89, the Commission received about 40,000 complaints. Of these 
less than 4,000 were pursued by the Commission.
109
 It initiated only 25 new court 
actions.
110
 In 1989-90, the Commission received abut 51,500 complaints and inquiries 
but only instituted 14 new court actions.
111
 
 
This integrated approach to enforcement has essentially remained unchanged today, 
although it is interesting to note the shift of emphasis as between litigation and 
enforceable undertakings negotiated outside court.  
 
Baxt‟s immediate successor, Professor Allan Fels, placed greater emphasis on 
litigation. From 1991 to 2002, court proceedings were instituted in 271 cases 
involving serious breaches of the TPA, of which 170 were fully heard and resulted in 
a judgment being given by the court, while 101 were settled by the parties.
112
  
 
Under the current Chairman, Graeme Samuel, who took over on 1 July 2002, 
litigation has declined considerably and the Commission is making greater use of out-
of-court undertakings to remedy potential breaches of the TPA. In 2003-4, the 
Commission initiated only 19 new court actions and accepted 33 undertakings, of 
which seven related to competition matters and 26 related to fair trading and 
consumer protection matters.
113
 In 2004-05, the Commission initiated 29 new court 
actions and accepted 55 undertakings, of which five related to competition matters 
and 50 related to fair trading and consumer protection matters.
114
 In 2005-06, the 
Commission initiated 13 new court actions and accepted 54 undertakings of which 4 
related to competition matters and 50 related to fair trading and consumer protection 
matters.
115
 
 
The third area in which Baxt made a significant contribution was in the area of policy 
development and the reform of the law itself. Baxt was a vociferous advocate for 
change in relation to increasing the penalty levels; increasing the funding for the 
Commission so that it could carry out its mandate more effectively; promoting the 
universal application of the TPA and the development of a coherent competition 
policy. 
 
Baxt came to the Commission at a time when it was increasingly being called upon by 
the Government to play a key role in the process of de-regulation and micro- 
economic change which was then taking place in areas such as the financial markets, 
telecommunications, the waterfront, airline deregulation and the rural sector. Its role 
was to stimulate and protect the competitive forces needed to ensure that these 
programs of de-regulation and micro-economic reform, in fact, delivered the 
anticipated benefits. 
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Unlike many other lawyers and Government officials he was capable of seeing the big 
picture – where the TPA fits in the overall scheme of public policy.  In many respects 
Baxt was ahead of his time and it wasn‟t until long after he had left the Commission 
that the initiatives he had been promoting were finally adopted.  .  
 
His intellectual ability, high ideals, energy and enthusiasm fitted him well for the job. 
On many occasions he demonstrated that he was fearless and was not afraid to stick 
his neck out. For example, he believed that the professions should be subject to 
competition law and he was not afraid to incur the wrath of the legal profession in 
pushing for these changes.  
 
He believed that the TPC should be transparent in its decision-making and 
enforcement of the TPA and refused to enter into secret deals with the „Captains of 
Industry‟ to avoid litigation in the courts. He believed that the Commission should be 
accountable and made a point of explaining the Commission‟s decisions to those 
affected by them even if it meant facing an angry and hostile group.  
 
After three years of intensely hard work administering the law and lobbying for the 
necessary changes, he left the Commission somewhat disillusioned at the lack of 
political understanding and the political will make the necessary changes. 
 
The Commission‘s funding was very bad and the penalties were silly. It was 
hard for the Commission to run cases given the low fines. I had reached the 
end of my tether. Perhaps I did overstep the mark in terms of writing policy 
arguments but it was just so frustrating for the Commission.
116
 
 
Baxt chose to debate these issues in public and was not averse to criticising the 
Government publicly when it failed to respond to his calls for change.  
 
In retrospect, Baxt admits that he may have been naïve about resources and funding 
and that it was a mistake to accept the appointment without having first obtained a 
guarantee about additional funding for the Commission to achieve his ambitious plans 
for its future.
117
 He also admits that Baxt that he was not a Canberra „insider‟ and did 
not have the contacts within the bureaucracy: „I was commuting to Canberra so I 
wasn‘t living in Canberra and I didn‘t quite understand the thrust of the Canberra 
lifestyle and the bureaucracy.‘ 118 
 
Nevertheless, his record as Chairman is outstanding. The law, especially in relation to 
mergers and misuse of market power, had been tested in the courts. The Government 
had accepted the need to expand the coverage of the TPA and to develop a coherent 
micro-economic reform package that relied on market forces and competition to 
promote economic growth and enhance consumer welfare. The Government had 
accepted the need for penalties to be increased.  
 
Baxt may not have entirely succeeded in achieving all of his objectives; however, by 
the time he left, the Commission was a far more effective enforcement agency. It had 
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gained in recognition and profile despite its lack of resources, and was ready to enter 
the next phase of its development. The Commission „became very approachable‟.119 
Baxt had „popularised trade practices law‟.120 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Baxt was perceived by the Labor Government that appointed him as too much of an 
advocate for change. He was too innovative, too out-spoken and too aggressive in his 
criticism of the Government. Baxt conceded that he may have over-stepped the mark 
at times in terms of expressing his views on maters of policy.
121
 
 
We asked Baxt to nominate his greatest single success at the Commission and his 
greatest failure. 
 
I think that the greatest success I had was that the Commission was able to 
win back the respect of the business and legal community which I think had 
been lost in the McComas‘ years.  I really think it had lost it.  I think people 
were very cynical about the Commission, so I think that was my greatest 
success.  People saying: ‗Well, we‘ve got someone there who is trying to do 
something.‘   My greatest failure was the failure to persuade the politicians to 
see the way.  I was hopeless at that. I‘m glad I didn‘t decide to be a 
politician.
122
 
 
We also asked Baxt what legacy he had left to his successor:  
 
I gave Fels a ―rolling ball‖. The Commission was starting to run big cases. I 
started the debate so that the Commission was ready to go forward. My 
Monash Workshops kept the trade practices topic alive.
123
 
 
It is noteworthy that his successor, Professor Alan Fels, refused to publish Baxt‟s 
report of his term as Chairman in the Annual Report for 1990-91 – a precedent 
established after Ron Bannerman resigned as Chairman.
124
  It would appear that the 
Commission under Fels did not want to be seen to be endorsing Baxt‟s criticisms of 
the Government by including them in the TPC‟s Annual Report. 125 During Fels term 
as Chairman, the way the Commission „handled‟ the government of the day would be 
very different. 
 
Baxt maintained the highest ethical standards throughout his term as Chairman 
applying the law without fear or favour. On 30 January 1990, he announced his 
intention to become a partner with the Melbourne law firm, Arthur Robinson & 
Hedderwicks after his term as Chairman ended on 30 June 1990. He would join the 
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firm‟s taxation department, but would provide corporate and trade practices advice as 
well. He gave a voluntary undertaking not to have formal contact with the 
Commission of its staff for 12 months after his term ended. For the remainder of his 
term as Chairman of the TPC he agreed to exempt himself from any involvement in 
matters in which Arthur Robinson & Hedderwicks were acting for their clients. 
 
On 9 June 2003, Baxt was appointed an Officer of the Order of Australia. The award 
was granted „for service to the law, particularly as a leading spokesperson in the areas 
of trade practice, competition, taxation and corporate law, and in the field of legal 
education.‟ His contribution as a teacher, law reformer and regulator had finally been 
recognised by the Australian Government. 
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